By FARHAD AHAD

As an Afghan-American and a participant in the international Afghan community, I am puzzled and disappointed over Secretary of State Colin Powell's latest stance on the Taliban. In a State Department briefing, Powell said that if the Taliban comply with U.S. requests to turn over Osama bin Laden, then Afghanistan would go back to where it was before the attacks, with the Taliban running the country "whether for good or for bad." In an interview with The Associated Press, he went further and said, "If they did that, we wouldn't be worrying about whether they are the regime in power or not," and "it's a tough place to fight conventional battles."

Why would Powell make such remarks? Back in May, in a news conference announcing $43 million of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, Powell stated that the aid "will bypass the Taliban," who, in fact, were not helpful "but worsen the relief situation." First, how the aid reached the people of Afghanistan and where it went remains unclear to Afghan-Americans. Second, Powell is aware that the Taliban: 1) harbor and defend the indicted terrorists including members of al-Qaida, 2) have committed unspeakable crimes against humanity in Afghanistan, 3) do not have any meaningful support among the vast majority of the people of Afghanistan, 4) lack international credibility, 5) are to women in Afghanistan what the fascist Nazis were to Jews, and 6) in addition to committing genocide against the non-Pashtun Afghan majority -- the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras -- they are guilty of carrying out razing, murdering, raping and looting throughout parts of Afghanistan under their occupation. Exactly how narrow are Powell's targets? Does he believe that "smoking Osama out of his hole," "dead or alive," will stop the Taliban from continuing their campaign of crimes against humanity?

After the Persian Gulf War, I read Bob Woodward's book The Commanders, which included profiles of the military figures behind the U.S. and the commanders' stances on the war. Then, as now, Powell voiced steadfast objections to freeing Kuwait using military force and promoted ousting Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein through economic sanctions. Powell thus effectively disobeyed the commander in chief, who had decided the only option to force Saddam out of Kuwait was through the use of force. Today, the statistics are against Powell: It is estimated that some 20,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed in the war. However, the casualty toll of the economic blockade against Iraq stands at approximately 50 times that number -- 1 million children victims. So why is it that Powell shies away from military action -- followed by humanitarian and economic aid -- instead of ongoing sanctions and isolation?

Woodward claims that as a commander in Vietnam, Powell was committed to protecting his men in uniform. The "Zero Casualty" doctrine is the work of Powell, and he has promoted it time and again in public interviews. In fact, and understandably, the American public has rewarded him with great trust and the highest prestige for his remarkable record of sustaining minimal American casualties. Yet today, the war against terrorism is different. The philosophy of "Zero Casualty" might be acceptable in wars of limited scope, such as bombing raids in Kosovo; however, will it succeed as a tactic in America's "new war"?

As a student of political science and history, I strongly believe that had the U.S. special operation forces carried out the mission to snatch bin Laden from Afghanistan as far back as two years ago, the world would be a much safer place now. The operation risked the loss of a small number of lives in the special operation forces; the outcome would have prevented the attacks on civilian targets, perhaps saving more than 6,500 innocent lives. The mission was canceled, perhaps, because of the risk involved in this type of operation.

Afghan-Americans, who lost at least one of their own heroes in the World Trade Center tragedy, one of the first emergency medical technicians to arrive at the scene, are left to assume that for Powell, the lives of men in uniform might be of greater value than those of civilians. Unsuspecting attacks on civilians can be forgiven through diplomacy, but soldiers' lives will not be placed at risk. It is disconcerting to think that despite the fact that history is against Powell's doctrine, he continues to dismiss the significant threat to American and universal humanitarian principles posed by the isolated and oppressive Taliban militia.

For this Afghan-American, Powell's remarks resemble nothing short of a lack of regard for innocent civilians, whether they are the people of Afghanistan or Americans in the United States or around the world, as long as the military incurs no casualties. Is this how Powell plans to fight the new war? By turning a blind eye to collaborators of the terrorists, in an attempt to subdue a hypothetical "cycle of violence," or rewarding them with monetary and political means? It is difficult to think the terrorists will not be encouraged to behave more audaciously the next time they are ready to carry out an attack. The acts from Kobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, to the embassies in Africa, to the USS Cole, all the way to the U.S. soil, should be lessons that rewarding terrorism with inaction is a recipe for further, and more tragic, acts.

Ahad, a financial manager, is from Afghanistan and has lived in the United States for 15 years and in Houston for two. He is head of Afghan Solidarity, a youth activist group based in Houston, and is a member of the Institute for Afghan Studies.